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2006]
SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE v. MEYER: WEEDING THROUGH
THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY
ACT'S DEFINITION OF "SOLID WASTE"
I. INTRODUCTION
The Kentucky bluegrass seed grown in Idaho is distributed
throughout the nation for lawns, golf courses and other uses.1
Bluegrass seed is usually planted in the spring and produces seed
during the summer of the following year. 2 When the seed is har-
vested, the growers cut down most of the plant to prepare the crop
for combining - a process separating the seed from the rest of the
plant.3 The straw and stubble remain in the field after the seed is
taken from the field and prepared for commercial distribution. 4
Growers burn this leftover residue in a practice known as "open
burning."'5 It is estimated that over ninety-five percent of the acres
registered by bluegrass growers are burned in this manner.6
For decades, bluegrass growers have employed the technique
of open burning.7 The practice has garnered closer scrutiny be-
cause of new health science information and recent allegations that
open burning of bluegrass residue causes respiratory problems for
nearby residents. 8 Although bluegrass growers may be in compli-
1. See Activists Threaten to Sue Field Burners, http://www.web.kitsapsun.com/
redesign/2003-07-01/local/190738.shtml (on file with author) (noting that Farm-
ers argue open burning produces no more pollution than diesel exhaust or wood
burning).
2. See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004)
(explaining planting and harvesting process). Bluegrass plants are between fifteen
and thirty-six inches tall when they produce seed that can be harvested. See id.
3. See id. (noting growers use "curing" process, before combining, to dry out
and ripen head of crop where seed is located on bluegrass plant).
4. See id. (explaining separation process of bluegrass harvesting).
5. See id. (stating that despite open burning, entire planting process can be
repeated as long as bluegrass field can sustain it and remain productive).
6. See NORTH IDAHO FARMERS ASSOCIATION, ABOUT POSTHARVEST BURNING,
http://www.northidahofarmers.org/fieldburning.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004)
(providing field burning statistics for 1997-2000, updated in 2001).
7. See Safe Air for Everyone, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.
safeairforeveryone.com/index.php?id=faqs (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinaf-
ter FAQs] (responding to question of how recently grass burning has been health
concern because it is not new practice).
8. See Safe Air for Everyone, Health and Scientific Information, www.
safeairforeveryone.com/index.php?id=health (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (noting
alleged respiratory problems include irritated eyes, nose and mouth; increased
coughing and wheezing; decreased lung function; and possible development of
(217)
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ance with the Clean Air Act and Idaho state law, clean air advocates,
such as Safe Air for Everyone, argue carcinogenic toxins in the
smoke from the bluegrass fields endanger local residents.9
In Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer10 (Safe Air), the Ninth Circuit
asked whether the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) prohibited Idaho farmers (Farmers) from openly burning
residue left in the fields after the Kentucky bluegrass harvest based
on the idea that such residue constituted "solid waste" under
RCRA. 11 In deciding this issue, the court found it necessary to ex-
amine the congressional intent behind RCRA, and how such legisla-
tion should be interpreted when words in the statute are not
precisely defined.12 The Ninth Circuit found in favor of the Farm-
ers, holding that the bluegrass residue did not fall within RCRA's
definition of "solid waste."' 3
This Note examines RCRA's definition of "solid waste" in light
of Safe Air.14 Section II discusses the facts leading up to the Ninth
Circuit's consideration of Safe Air.15 Section III explains the history
and purpose of RCRA, the process of statutory interpretation, other
circuit courts' interpretations of RCRA's language and the federal
summary judgment standard.1 6 Section IV details the Ninth Cir-
cuit's examination of the case. 17 Section V analyzes the court's de-
termination of the case.18 Finally, Section VI contemplates the
possible effects of this decision on the future enforcement of RCRA
and within the bluegrass industry.19
lung disease); see also Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038 (asserting high concentrations of
pollutants create serious respiratory problems for residents near bluegrass fields).
9. See FAQs, supra note 7 (explaining that despite dangerous spikes in num-
ber of particulates during open burning season, Farmers continue burning be-
cause federal standards under Clean Air Act were designed for continuous
smokestack polluters and allow distorted calculation of averages).
10. 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).
11. See id. at 1037 (explaining central issue of case).
12. See id. at 1040-41 (discussing how court tried to tackle case's primary
question).
13. See id. at 1037 (stating holding of Ninth Circuit).
14. For a further discussion of "solid waste" in Safe Air, see infra notes 85-103
and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of the facts of Safe Air, see infra notes 20-39 and
accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the history of RCRA, see infra notes 40-82 and
accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's examination of Safe Air, see
infra notes 83-114 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of how the court handled Safe Air, see infra notes
115-64 and accompanying text.
19. For a further discussion of the impact of Safe Air, see infra notes 165-76
and accompanying text.
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II. FACTS
Safe Air for Everyone (SAFE) petitioned the Ninth Circuit to
enjoin the Farmers from their practice of openly burning bluegrass
residue because the practice violated RCRA. 20 SAFE is a "non-profit
corporation formed by individuals in Idaho, Washington and Mon-
tana" created to stop the practice of open burning.2 1 SAFE brought
this action under the "citizen suit" provision of RCRA, which pro-
hibits the "disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may pre-
sent imminent or substantial endangerment to health or the
environment ... "22 SAFE filed the action against seventy-five indi-
viduals and corporations that grew Kentucky bluegrass commer-
cially in Idaho and practiced open burning.23 SAFE alleged that
the smoke from the grass burning process was a public danger that
could cause severe respiratory problems for nearby residents. 24 In
addition, SAFE argued the open burning of bluegrass residue con-
stituted a "disposal" of "solid waste" within the meaning of RCRA. 25
The District Court of Idaho dismissed the action pursuant to
the Farmers' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (1) mo-
tion.2 6 Rule 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to make a motion
against the plaintiff's claim if the court lacks subject matter jurisdic-
tion.2 7 Such a motion may be factual or facial. 28 In this case, the
Farmers chose to make a factual attack. 29 When asserting a factual
attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that in-
voke federal jurisdiction.3 0 A court, however, is not obligated to
20. See Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2004) (ex-
plaining civil procedures in case which led up to Ninth Circuit review).
21. See id. at 1038 (detailing history of SAFE).
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (B) (2000) (explaining circumstances when pri-
vate party can bring civil action to enforce RCRA).
23. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038 (noting all bluegrass farmers named as de-
fendants practice open burning).
24. See id. (noting SAFE advocates stoppage of open burning practice in
Idaho, Washington and Montana).
25. See id. at 1037 (relating SAFE's argument to why RCRA is applicable in this
case).
26. See FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b) (1) (explaining when party can assert pleading for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction); see also Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (noting factual
12(b)(1) challenge allows district court to receive evidence beyond initial
complaint).
27. SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 12(b) (1) (discussing possible defenses against civil claim).
28. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th
Cir. 2000)) (explaining that facial challenge attacks allegations on their face, while
factual challenge attacks truth of allegations).
29. See id. (discussing Farmers' 12(b) (1) jurisdictional attack).
30. See id. (noting that factual challenge allows court to review evidence be-
yond pleadings to determine if allegations are true).
2006] 219
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presume the truthfulness of the allegations.31 The Farmers argued
that the jurisdictional and substantive issues were so closely related
to the determination of RCRA's statutory provision that the court
did not have the requisite subject matter jurisdiction to hear the
action.32 The district court agreed and dismissed the claim for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 33
SAFE then appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.34 SAFE
argued that granting motions on federal subject matter jurisdiction
is unusual and is warranted only when a claim cites the Constitution
or a federal statute solely for the purpose of litigating in federal
court. 35 Furthermore, SAFE claimed that when a federal statute
provides the court's jurisdiction and the plaintiffs substantive claim
of relief, a grant of a factual Rule 12(b) (1) motion is only proper
when the allegations are frivolous.3 6
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion, it relied on different reasoning. 37 The court found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction but stated that bluegrass residue was not
covered under RCRA. 38 Ultimately, the court held SAFE did not
have a sustainable RCRA claim.39
III. BACKGROUND
A. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Enacted in 1976, RCRA aimed to control the three to four bil-
lion tons of discarded waste generated each year by Americans, and
the problems arising from the anticipated eight percent annual in-
31. See id. (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242) (noting that when moving party
presents evidence of affidavits to support its motion to dismiss, motion to dismiss
becomes factual motion).
32. See Sun Valley Gas. Inc. v. Ernst Enters. Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir.
1983) (stating that jurisdictional findings are inappropriate where jurisdictional
and substantive issues are intertwined so that jurisdiction depends on facts); see also
Thornhill Publ'g Co. v. Gen. Tel. & Elec. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir.
1979) (concluding that jurisdictional and substantive issues are dependant on
each other when statute provides basis for both subject matter jurisdiction of fed-
eral court and plaintiff's claim for relief).
33. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1039 (giving district court's holding).
34. See id. at 1038 (stating Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to hear SAFE's appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000)).
35. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946) (explaining when such juris-
dictional dismissals are required).
36. See Thornhill, 594 F.2d at 734 (discussing when motion to dismiss for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction is proper).
37. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1037 (giving holding of case).
38. See id. (explaining how Ninth Circuit has used different reasoning in reach-
ing its opinion).
39. See id. (affirming lower court under different reasoning).
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crease in the amount of such waste. 40 RCRA's strategy was to re-
duce generated waste and ensure proper treatment of discarded
waste in order to lessen the harmful effects of such disposal on
human health and the environment. 4 1 Congress determined the
traditional language used to describe these discarded materials, the
term "solid waste," was inappropriate because its ordinary defini-
tion was too limited for RCRA's purposes. 4 2 With this in mind,
Congress expanded the statutory definition of solid waste to in-
clude "any garbage . . .and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations
"43
Recognizing that the national concern over increasing amount
of solid waste required federal action to supplement existing state,
regional and local efforts, 44 Congress placed the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) in charge of waste regulation, assistance
and planning under RCRA.45 RCRA contains a "citizen suit" provi-
sion which allows private citizens to enforce the statute in specific
circumstances. 46 The provision states that a civil action may be
brought "against any person .. .who has contributed or who is
contributing to the past or present handling.., or disposal of any
solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment to health or the environment .... ,47 Con-
fronted with the task of interpreting this provision of the RCRA, a
40. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491(I), at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6240 (explaining purpose of RCRA).
41. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (quoting 42
U.S.C. § 6902(b) (2000)) (noting natural policy underlying RCRA).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491(I), at 2-3 (discussing preference for term "dis-
carded material," over false connotations of term "solid waste").
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000) (defining "solid waste" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6901 (2000)). The definition of solid waste included "refuse, sludge from a
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facil-
ity .... " Id.
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (a) (2)-(4) (explaining scope of solid waste disposal
problem).
45. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (I), at 4 (noting that EPA was also charged with
task of studying sources of solid waste, existing disposal methods and potential
dangers to human health and environment stemming from mishandling of such
wastes).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (1) (B) (2000) (stating that private citizens have
opportunity to enforce RCRA); see also Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 484 (discussing reme-
dies available in RCRA).
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (1) (B) (emphasis added) (explaining action can
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court's analysis depends heavily on the principles of statutory
construction. 48
B. Statutory Interpretation in the Ninth Circuit
1. Wilderness Society v. United States Fish & Wildlife Service49
In Wilderness Society, the Ninth Circuit laid out a two-step analy-
sis to interpret a statute's meaning in accordance with the tradi-
tional canons of statutory interpretation. 50 The first step of
statutory interpretation is to look at the statute's language. 51 If a
particular word or phrase in the statute is not defined by the stat-
ute, the word should take on its "ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning. '52 The second step, should the word continue to remain
unclear, is to determine the purpose of the statute by examining its
legislative history.53
2. Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowd 4
In Hanford, EPA proposed adding the Hanford Nuclear Reser-
vation to the country's list of serious hazardous waste sites.55 Plain-
tiffs, the Hanford Downwinders Coalition (Coalition), sought
injunctive relief under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) against the
Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), which
48. See Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (dis-
cussing court's duties when interpreting RCRA provision).
49. 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003).
50. See id. at 1060 (laying out process for interpretation of statutes). The
plaintiffs argued the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service violated the Wilderness Act by
granting an unsound permit for an enhancement project which would allow the
release of hatchery-raised salmon into Tustumena Lake. See id. at 1055. The Wil-
derness Act contains a mandate to preserve the "natural conditions" as part of the
"natural character" of the area where Tustumena Lake is located. See id. The
court found for the plaintiffs. See id. at 1060.
51. See id. at 1060 (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd. v. Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 56 (1987)) (noting first step in statutory interpretation process).
52. See id. (citing United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998))
(quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)) (describing process when
words in statutes are not defined); see also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (explaining that unambiguous meaning of
language should be adopted unless there is clear legislative intent to contrary).
53. See Wilderness Society, 353 F.3d at 1060 (stating legislative history can eluci-
date what Congress intended statute to accomplish if language remains unclear).
54. 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
55. See id. at 1471-72 (explaining Hanford's plutonium producing history be-
ginning with Manhattan Project and continuing for thirty years).
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was in charge of preparing a health assessment of the area.56 The
Coalition wanted the ATSDR to begin a health surveillance pro-
gram to satisfy CERCLA's definition of "removal or remedial ac-
tion."57 Although the Ninth Circuit found the ATSDR satisfied its
statutory obligations, the court indicated that because CERCLA was
enacted to protect public health, CERCLA should be read broadly
to best satisfy Congress' purpose of protecting public health.58 The
court held that the ATSDR's health surveillance assessment was a
"removal or remedial action" that was entided to protection. 59
C. Interpretations of RCRA before Safe Air
1. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit determined that "discarded materials," one of
the subsets created by Congress' statutory definition of "solid
waste," did not include materials that were part of a continuous pro-
cess for beneficial reuse or recycling by the generating industry.60
In American Mining Congress v. EPA61 (AMC 1), a group of mining
and oil refining companies challenged EPA's right to regulate re-
used materials in their respective industries. 62 The D.C. Circuit
held that EPA's jurisdiction was limited to materials that were "truly
discarded, disposed of, thrown away, or abandoned. '63 The AMC I
court held that Congress did not intend EPA to regulate reused
materials as they did not contribute to the waste disposal
problem. 64
56. See id. at 1472-73 (noting government was trying to clean up hazardous
waste at Hanford Nuclear Reservation after its thirty years of producing plu-
tonium).
57. See id. at 1473 (discussing plaintiff's claim).
58. See id. at 1477-78 (noting Congress' authorization of President to take
health-related removal action in CERCLA provision as evidence that ATSDR health
study constituted removal action); see also United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems.
Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376-77 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting RCRA is remedial statute).
59. See Hanford, 71 F.3d at 1477 (explaining interpretation of CERCLA).
60. See Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2004)(citing Am. Mining Cong. v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 824 F.2d 1177, 1186
(D.C. Cir. 1987)) (holding in-process materials not part of "discarded materials"
definition). For further information on how "discarded materials" fits into RCRA's
definition of "solid waste," see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
61. 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
62. See id. at 1186 (explaining waste is not "disposed" if used in continuous
process).
63. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041 (noting degree to which D.C. Circuit wished
materials to be abandoned to qualify as "discarded").
64. See AMC Iat 1186 (explaining why materials reused by generating industry
are not "discarded" for purposes of RCRA's definition of "solid waste").
2006] 223
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The D.C. Circuit refined this interpretation with its decision in
American Mining Congress v. United States EPA65 (AMC I/).66 In that
case, the petitioner objected to the EPA's classification of waste-
water sludge kept in land disposal units as "discarded" material. 67
The petitioner argued that the sludge had the potential to be re-
used in the future and should not be considered "discarded."68
The D.C. Circuit held that AMC Iapplied to materials "destined for
immediate reuse in another phase of the industry's ongoing pro-
cess."69 This meant there was nothing improper about EPA classify-
ing the petitioner's wastewater sludge as "discarded. 70
2. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit found the length of time materials accu-
mulate while awaiting potential reuse is important in determining if
materials are "solid waste. ' 71 In Connecticut Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n
v. Remington Arms Co.72 (Connecticut Fishermen), the Connecticut De-
partment of Environmental Protection (DEP) brought an action
against a gun club, alleging that debris from the club's bullet cas-
ings and clay targets, which had fallen into the waters near the
Long Island Sound, constituted "solid waste." 73 The court deter-
mined that the debris "had accumulated long enough" to be con-
sidered "discarded" within the RCRA's definition of "solid waste." 74
The court's holding, however, did not set a bright line rule for de-
termining how long of an accumulation period is necessary for
waste to qualify as "discarded material."75
65. 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
66. See id. (modifying D.C. Circuit's earlier ruling in AMC 1).
67. See id. at 1186 (noting EPA classified stored sludge as "discarded" because
it threatened health of nearby residents).
68. See id. at 1185 (explaining ability to be "disposed" is requirement of "solid
waste" definition under RCRA).
69. See id. at 1186 (emphasis added) (quoting AMCI, 824 F.2d at 1185) (find-
ing nothing in AMC I to prevent treating sludge waste as "discarded").
70. See AMC I, 907 F.2d at 1186 (explaining court's analysis in AMC 1).
71. See Conn. Coastal Fishermen's Ass'n. v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d
1305, 1316 (2d Cir. 1993) (arguing time before materials are reused fits into
analysis).
72. 989 F.2d 1305 (2d Cir. 1993).
73. See Safe Air For Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1042 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004)
(emphasizing length of time debris remained in water); see also AMC II, 907 F.2d at
1179 (holding materials stored for potential reuse in future are "discarded materi-
als" under RCRA).
74. See Connecticut Fishermen, 989 F.2d at 1316 (stating holding of case).
75. See id. (noting court intentionally did not decide on set time necessary for
accumulation).
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3. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit held that whether material can be reused
or has some value to a reclaimer or salvager is irrelevant in deter-
mining whether the material is "solid waste. '76 In United States v.
ILCO77 (ILCO), a lead smelting company challenged the EPA's reg-
ulation of disposal of lead plates from recycled automobile batter-
ies.78 The court found that even though the batteries were valuable
to the smelting company that salvaged them, this value was insuffi-
cient to find they were not discarded, in light of the deference to
EPA determination as supported by congressional authority.79
D. Federal Summary Judgment Standard
When determining whether to grant a motion for summary
judgment, the court must determine whether the claim contains a
genuine issue of material fact.8 0 The court must view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.8 ' Where no
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must grant a motion
to dismiss the matter.8 2
IV. NARRATrrv ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit considered two issues in Safe Air.83 The first
was whether the district court erred in granting the Farmers' mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.814 The second
and more central issue of the case was whether bluegrass residue
76. See United States v. ILCO Inc., 996 F.2d 1126, 1131 (lth Cir. 1993)
(describing factors not determinative in defining solid waste).
77. 996 F.2d 1126 (lth Cir. 1993).
78. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1042 (arguing company never disposed of lead
plates); see also ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1129 (noting ILCO was reclaiming old batteries
to run them through smelting process to produce lead ingots for sale).
79. See ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1132 (explaining reasonableness of EPA interpreta-
tion of "discarded" as meaning "discarded once"). The court stated "[w]ere we to
rule otherwise, waste such as these batteries would arguably be exempt from regu-
lation under RCRA merely because they are potentially recyclable." Id.
80. See Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yamaka Indian
Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining how court reviews sum-
mary judgment motion).
81. See id. at 1044 (explaining court's process when applying FED. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
82. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976)
(noting dismissal is improper if party has stated valid claim).
83. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038 (discussing two main issues).
84. See id. at 1038 n.2 (noting district court also dismissed SAFE's common
law nuisance claim on this same matter).
2006]
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could be classified as "solid waste" under RCRA.85 If the residue
was classified as "solid waste," then the Farmers' practice of open
burning would be held unlawful.8 6
The Ninth Circuit quickly dispensed with the issue of whether
the district court erred in granting the Rule 12(b)(1) motion.8 7
The court found that the district court erred in granting the mo-
tion because the Farmers failed to show that SAFE's federal claims
were frivolous or set forth solely to obtain federal jurisdiction.8 8
The court went on to examine SAFE's allegations using a summary
judgment standard rather than a Rule 12(b) (1) challenge by the
Farmers because dismissal was based on the conclusion that blue-
grass residue was not "solid waste" under the RCRA.8 9
To prevail in an action brought under RCRA's "citizen suit"
provision, SAFE needed to establish that the Farmers contributed
to the "disposal of solid or hazardous waste which may present an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment."90 In the instant case, SAFE argued that the bluegrass resi-
due constituted "solid waste" under RCRA. 91 To determine if a
genuine issue of material fact existed on this issue, the court re-
viewed RCRA's definition of "solid waste," interpretations of statu-
tory language in case law and RCRA's legislative history.9 2
A. RCRA's Definitions
SAFE argued bluegrass residue could be classified under the
"other discarded material" subset within RCRA's definition of "solid
85. See id. at 1040 (noting that this question will determine whether summary
judgment will be granted).
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (a) (1) (B) (2000) (stating disposal of solid waste must
also present "imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environ-
ment" to gamer standing under RCRA "citizen suit provision").
87. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038-40 (stating court's analysis of district court's
grant of 12(b) (1) motion).
88. See id. at 1039 (explaining standard for granting factual 12(b) (1) chal-
lenges).
89. See id. at 1040 (citing Great W Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1254
(9th Cir. 1976)) (reviewing district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction as a
grant of summary judgment where dismissal was based on interpretation of phrase
in statute).
90. See id. at 1041 (noting that SAFE does not allege that bluegrass residue is
hazardous waste); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (1) (B) (2000) (stating against whom
suit can be brought).
91. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1040 (discussing court's handling of second issue
regarding statutory interpretation).
92. See id. (explaining application of RCRA to SAFE's allegations).
10
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waste."9 3 SAFE claimed the primary purpose of burning the blue-
grass residue was "sunlight absorption and enhancing productive
life of bluegrass fields."9 4 The Farmers responded that they did not
"discard" bluegrass residue; and therefore, it could not be consid-
ered "solid waste" under RCRA.95 In addition, the Farmers main-
tained they reused the residue as part of a continuous process of
growing bluegrass. 9 6 They contended the reused material served
several crucial functions, such as extending the life of the fields,
restoring fertilizers and minerals to the soil, reducing the threat of
insects and maximizing the soil's sunlight absorption. 97
In response to House Report 94-1491's declaration that
"[m]uch ... agricultural waste is reclaimed or put to new use and is
therefore not a part of the discarded materials disposal problem,"
SAFE argued that "much" does not mean "all" agricultural waste so
that bluegrass residue could still be "discarded" under RCRA. 98
SAFE also claimed Congress's assertion that "agricultural wastes
which are returned to the soil as fertilizers are not considered dis-
carded materials in the sense of this legislation" did not exempt
bluegrass residue because it is burned rather than mulched back
into the soil.9 9 The Farmers responded that RCRA's legislative his-
tory showed the statute's purpose was to handle waste products that
contributed to landfill problems and not those waste products that
were reused as fertilizers. 10 0
The Ninth Circuit held that because RCRA does not define
"discarded material," the court would define the word "discard" by
93. See id. at 1041 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000)) (defining term "solid
waste"). Solid waste is "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant,
water supply treatment plant or air pollution control facility and other discarded ma-
terial, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations ... " (emphasis
added)). Id.
94. See id. at 1044 (discussing SAFE's argument of why bluegrass residue ful-
fills definition of "discarded").
95. See id. at 1043 (arguing bluegrass residue should not be defined under
RCRA as "solid waste" because it was continuously reused).
96. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1043 (defending against allegation that residue is
"discarded material").
97. See id. at 1043-44 (explaining alleged benefits of openly burning bluegrass
residue).
98. See id. at 1045 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (I), at 3 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6239-41) (examining legislative intent regarding agricultural
waste reused as fertilizers).
99. See id. at 1046 n.13 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1491(I), at 3) (noting
SAFE's response to House Report's comment).
100. See id. at 1045 (noting legislative history in favor of Farmers' position); see




Senior: Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer: Weeding through the Resource Cons
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
228 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAwJouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 217
its ordinary meaning in accordance with the rules of statutory inter-
pretation. 10 1 The court defined "discard" as "[to] cast aside; reject;
abandon; give up."10 2 Agreeing with the Farmers' arguments that
bluegrass was not "discarded" but rather used in a continuous
growth process, the court held bluegrass residue was not "discarded
material" and thus could not be "solid waste" under the RCRA. 103
B. Applicability of Previous Interpretations of RCRA
The Ninth Circuit, for further guidance, examined other cir-
cuit courts' interpretations of the definition of "discarded" within
RCRA's definition of "solid waste." 10 4 The court found further sup-
port that bluegrass residue was not "solid waste" by examining the
facts of Safe Air alongside the circuit courts' holdings. 105
1. D. C. Circuit
SAFE did not contest the Farmers' use of bluegrass residue in a
continuous farming process, which was the main consideration in
AMC L106 The Farmers were able to produce evidence that the in-
dustry practice of burning bluegrass residue was designed to help
promote the continuous process of growing and harvesting blue-
grass. 10 7 Unlike the stored wastewater sludge in AMC II, the blue-
grass residue in Safe Air was immediately reused, rather than being
stored for possible future use. 108
2. Second Circuit
The Ninth Circuit held that SAFE presented no evidence that
bluegrass residue was left out in the fields for long periods of
time. 10 9 This made the residue distinguishable from the bullet cas-
ings in Connecticut Fishermen. 0 Considering the technique used in
101. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041 (stating term "discard" should be defined by
ordinary meaning in order to determine whether statute was violated).
102. Id. (citing THE NEw SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 684 (4th ed.,
1993)) (providing dictionary definition of "discard").
103. See id., 373 F.3d at 1047 (holding Kentucky bluegrass residue is not "solid
waste" within RCRA meaning).
104. See id. at 1041 (examining other circuits' interpretation to determine
definition of "solid waste").
105. See id. at 1045 (comparing Safe Air to other circuit cases).
106. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1045 (examining open burning practice against
AMC 1).
107. See id. (discussing continuous process of growing bluegrass).
108. See id. (explaining AMC I/s additional requirement to AMC I standard
for EPA classifications under RCRA).
109. See id. (noting bluegrass is reused, not discarded).
110. See id. (comparing Safe Air to Connecticut Fishermen).
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working bluegrass fields, it is in the best interest of growers to clear
the field quickly after harvest in order to plant the next bluegrass
crop (while it really does not matter how long you leave bullet cas-
ings in a field).'11
3. Eleventh Circuit
In Safe Air, there was no dispute over the fact that the Farmers
who reused the bluegrass residue were the residue's original own-
ers. 112 The straw and stubble, which forms bluegrass residue, re-
mained after the Farmers harvested their own bluegrass plants.113
This was unlike the situation in ILCO where reclaimers or salvagers
were recycling automobile batteries.' 14
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit's holding that bluegrass residue is not "solid
waste" under the RCRA is not supported by previous case law for
numerous reasons. 115 First, the court limited RCRA's language
where unambiguous meanings should have controlled. 116 Second,
the court should not have considered interpretations from other
circuit cases because those cases involved more stringent EPA stan-
dards that were not applicable to the facts of Safe Air.17 Third, the
court created a sizable loophole in RCRA by allowing any reuse pro-
cess as long as waste is returned to the soil, thereby undermining
RCRA's purpose." 8 Fourth, the court ignored the genuine issue of
material fact that existed as to the value of the bluegrass residue to
the Farmers in the bluegrass growing process. 119 Fifth, the court
111. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1037 (determining Farmers' best interest). For a
discussion of bluegrass growing procedure, see supra notes 1-5 and accompanying
text.
112. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1045 (distinguishing between principle case's
facts and ILCO facts).
113. See id. at 1037 (noting Farmer's process of growing bluegrass).
114. See id. at 1045 (comparing ownership in ILCO and principle case).
115. See id. at 1048-53 (Paez,J., dissenting) (detailing reasons why holding is
not supported by previous case law).
116. See id. at 1048 (PaezJ., dissenting) (arguing bluegrass residue was "dis-
carded" within meaning of RCRA).
117. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1050 (PaezJ., dissenting) (discussing differences
between principle case and other circuit cases).
118. See id. at 1051-52 (Paez, J., dissenting) (examining loophole created by
court's decision).
119. See id. at 1052-53 n.9 (Paez, J., dissenting) (recognizing different argu-
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failed to follow its own rule of broadly interpreting a public health
statute.
20
A. Limitation of RCRA's Definitions
The Ninth Circuit misinterpreted the definition of "solid
waste" because it failed to adhere to the Wilderness Society rule of
applying the "ordinary, common meaning" of a term when it is un-
defined by a statute. 121 Here, the word in question was "dis-
carded."1 22 The majority defined "discarded" as "cast aside; reject;
abandon; give up."'123 But the majority modified this plain meaning
definition of "discarded" to reflect other circuits' interpretations of
RCRA in such cases as AMC I, AMC II and ILCO.a24 Overlooking
plain meaning, the Ninth Circuit complicated the definition of "dis-
carded" by inquiring whether the material was destined for benefi-
cial reuse, had the reuse potential, or the original owner was
reusing the material. 125
SAFE suggested the primary reason why the Farmers burn the
bluegrass residue is to clear the bluegrass fields for the next plant-
ing.126 Although the Farmers claimed open burning produces nu-
merous secondary benefits, they did not dispute SAFE's contention
that open burning to clear the fields, the Farmers' primary objec-
tive, constituted "discarding." 127 With no dispute, the Ninth Circuit
should have found that burning bluegrass residue to remove it was
within the ordinary definition of the word "discard.' 128
The Ninth Circuit's attempts to cite to RCRA's legislative his-
tory in supporting its decision also fail because its reading of RCRA
120. See Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1481 (9th
Cir. 1995) (noting public health statutes should be broadly interpreted).
121. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047 (Paez, J., dissenting) (citing Wilderness Soc'y
v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003)).
122. See id. at 1048 (explaining question of whether bluegrass residue consti-
tutes "solid waste" depends on whether residue is "discarded material" within
RCRA's definition).
123. See id. at 1041 (citing "discarded" as defined by THE NEW SHORTER OX-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 686 (4th ed. 1993)).
124. See id. at 1041-42 (discussing definition of "discarded").
125. See id. at 1043 (discussing analysis required to determine whether mate-
rial is "discarded" under RCRA).
126. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047-48 (Paez, J., dissenting) (noting even Farm-
ers' experts acknowledged primary reason open burning was practiced was to re-
move bluegrass residue).
127. See id. (Paez, J., dissenting) (noting secondary benefits include
fertilization).
128. See id. at 1048 (Paez, J., dissenting) (explaining SAFE must also prove
open burning endangered public health to succeed under this specific provision
of RCRA).
14
Villanova nvironmental Law Journal, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol17/iss1/3
DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE
was misguided. 129 Congress intended "solid waste" to include "any
* . .discarded materials resulting from . . .agricultural operations
... -"130 House Report 94-1491 demonstrates that Congress used
"discarded materials" to broaden RCRA's reach. 13 1 At the time of
RCRA's enactment, agricultural practices such as open burning of
bluegrass residue created 687 million tons of waste per year, the
second largest source of waste in the nation. 132 Therefore, the ma-
jority's interpretation of "solid waste" is inconsistent with RCRA's
intent.
B. Inapplicability of Other Circuit Cases
Failing to apply the plain meaning of "discarded," the Ninth
Circuit supported its decision by using other circuit cases such as
AMC I, AMC H and ILCO that hinged on the stricter definition of
"solid waste" created by EPA's RCRA regulations. 133 Although
RCRA defines "solid waste" as "any discarded material," EPA's defi-
nition of "discarded material" as any "abandoned, recycled, or in-
herently wastelike" material is more strict.'3 4 The main issue in the
other circuit cases was whether EPA exceeded its authority to regu-
late RCRA by imposing its own definition of "solid waste" rather
than using RCRA's broader definition. 135 In AMC I, plaintiffs ques-
tioned the EPA's authority to regulate reused materials in the min-
ing and oil refining industries. 13 6 In AMC II, petitioners tried to
circumvent EPA classifications by arguing wastewater sludge had
the potential to be reused. 137 Finally, in ILCO, the plaintiffs raised
the issue of whether EPA could regulate automobile batteries and
129. See id. at 1049 (Paez, J., dissenting) (arguing legislative history shows
Congress chose RCRA's language to broaden statute's reach).
130. See id. at 1049 (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000) (discussing Con-
gress' intent in defining "solid waste").
131. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491(I), at 3 (indicating Congress intended RCRA
to have broad reach).
132. See id. at 15 (showing Congress enacted RCRA to alleviate agricultural
waste disposal problems).
133. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1051 (Paez,J., dissenting) (explaining why other
circuit cases are not persuasive).
134. See id. at 1051 (Paez, J., dissenting) (referencing 40 C.F.R. pt.
261.2(b) (1) (1992)) (noting EPA's strict definition of "discarded materials").
135. See id. at 1048-49 (Paez, J., dissenting) (explaining that Congress does
not define "discarded materials" in RCRA so ordinary definition of "discarded"
should apply).
136. See AMC 1, 824 F.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (highlighting EPA in-
volvement in case).
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their components when the batteries are salvaged. 138 Given that
Safe Air does not stem from the enforcement of an EPA regulation
like AMC I, AMC I and ILCO, but rather from the alleged violation
of RCRA, these cases fail to provide persuasive authority. 139
C. Creation of a Loophole
The Ninth Circuit's holding created a loophole that permits
any disposal process as long as the waste is eventually returned to
the soil.14 ° The court cited House Report 94-1491's exception for
"agricultural wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers or
soil conditioners" as evidence that bluegrass residue is outside
RCRA's scope.141 The court indicated that determining whether
materials were "discarded" was independent from the method in
which such materials were handled.' 42 Such a posture disregards
crucial differences among waste handling methods.143 For exam-
ple, this analysis treats fertilization via burning and mulching
equally, ignoring that burning waste creates possible air pollution,
while mulching does not.144 The legislative history indicates that
this aspect of the majority's holding is contrary to Congress' overall
environmental policy; House Report 94-1491 demonstrates that
Congress considered burning, as a disposal method for waste, the
"last remaining loophole in environmental law.' 45 Furthermore,
no evidence shows that Congress wanted to create a special excep-
tion for burning bluegrass residue among other types of waste. 146
138. See ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126, 1127-28 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining action
arose in response to EPA enforcing regulating against secondary lead smelter).
139. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1035 (noting reasons why action was brought in
principle case); see also id. at 1051 (Paez, J., dissenting) (explaining that EPA has
responsibility of regulating "solid wastes" that are also "hazardous" under Subtitle
C of RCRA).
140. See id. at 1050 (Paez, J., dissenting) (responding to claim that because
burned bluegrass residue acts as fertilizer for fields that it is not "discarded" under
RCRA).
141. See id. at 1049-50 (Paez, J., dissenting) (quoting from H.R. REP. No. 94-
1491 (I), at 2) (explaining that bluegrass residue falls outside RCRA's scope).
142. See id. at 1050 n.6 (Paez, J., dissenting) (noting investigation into
whether residue is solid waste cannot be disentangled from residue handling).
143. See id. (discussing waste handling).
144. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1050 n.6 (Paez, J., dissenting) (giving example of
different effects that alternate disposal techniques have on environment).
145. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1491 (I), at 37-38, 90 (showing concern for air pollu-
tion that could result from burning).
146. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1050 (Paez, J., dissenting) (indicating there are
no statutes or other declarations from Congress creating special exception for
bluegrass residue burning).
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The Ninth Circuit, therefore, should not have ignored the impor-
tant issue of handling methods. 147
D. Genuine Issues of Material Fact Remain
Even if one were to follow the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the
court failed to recognize that a genuine issue of material fact ex-
isted in the case. 148 The question still remains of how the bluegrass
residue is destined for immediate reuse as part of the industry's
ongoing production process. 149 Inquiries into the Farmers' intent,
the purpose of removing the residue, and the mechanics of the pro-
cess are relevant. 150
On a summary judgment motion, dismissal is only appropriate
where no genuine issue of material fact exists.' 5 ' Using the major-
ity's analysis of "discarded" materials, the court requires an inquiry
into whether the bluegrass residue was reused in a continuous pro-
cess by the generating industry.152 A genuine issue of material fact
resulted, then, as to the value of the bluegrass residue to the Farm-
ers.1 53 While both sides acknowledged the benefits of bluegrass res-
idue to the growth process, the parties disagreed over whether it
was these benefits or the inexpensive nature of open burning that
determined why farmers utilized this method.' 5 4 With such a signif-
icant issue left unanswered, the Ninth Circuit should have reversed
the district court's holding and remanded the case. 155
147. See id. at 1049 (Paez, J., dissenting) (stating court was mistaken in consid-
ering other circuit court cases when determining definition of "discard" rather
than applying plain meaning).
148. See id. at 1051-53 (Paez, J., dissenting) (explaining unresolved issues of
material fact still exist).
149. See id. at 1052 (Paez, J., dissenting) (raising question of Farmers' intent
behind burning of bluegrass residue).
150. See id. (referring to length of time that residue is out in fields before it is
burned when speaking of "mechanics" of process).
151. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1254 (9th Cir. 1976)
(noting dismissal is improper if party has stated valid claim).
152. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1052 n.9 (Paez, J., dissenting) (reviewing steps in
majority's analysis of term "discarded").
153. See id. at 1052-53 (Paez, J., dissenting) (noting failure to resolve issue of
whether burning bluegrass residue is part of continuous process).
154. See id. at 1052 (Paez, J., dissenting) (explaining different accounts as to
value of bluegrass residue to Farmers).
155. See id. at 1052-53 (Paez, J., dissenting) (stating summary judgment is in-
appropriate where genuine issue of material fact exists).
2006] 233
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E. Unanswered Public Health Questions
The court's narrow interpretation of RCRA also diverges from
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Hanford,156 which noted that reme-
dial statutes aimed at protecting public health should be read
broadly in order to best satisfy legislative intent.157 By dismissing
Safe Air at such a preliminary stage, the court did not address the
central question of the claim-whether the open burning of blue-
grass residue threatens public health. 158
Currently, open burning of bluegrass residue is satisfactory
under EPA regulations and Idaho state law. 159 Open burning of
bluegrass residue, however, causes dangerous spikes in the number
of airborne pollutants, which could pose serious health problems to
local residents.160 This means unhealthy levels of airborne pollu-
tants are in the air during the field burning season but, when
viewed over the course of an entire year, the average amount of air
pollution falls within acceptable standards. 61 If the court inter-
preted RCRA broadly to include bluegrass residue as "solid waste,"
it could advance to a subsequent level of analysis and determine
whether the public health remains threatened despite compliance
with annual air pollution rates.1 62
The majority's decision to read RCRA's language narrowly pro-
hibits this statute from serving its legislative purpose of safely man-
aging the nation's solid waste. 163 In doing so, the majority leaves
unresolved a material issue regarding the true value of bluegrass
residue for the Farmers, creating a possible loophole for future pro-
ducers of solid waste to avoid RCRA as long as they return waste to
the soil, regardless of the environmental effects.' 64
156. 71 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1995).
157. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1049 n.4 (Paez, J., dissenting) (citing Hanford, 71
F.3d at 1481) (describing when remedial statutes should be read broadly).
158. See id. at 1038 n.1 (noting SAFE's contention that open burning causes
public health problems).
159. See NORTH IDAHO FARMERS ASSOCtATION, FACrS VS. MYT'HS ABOUT Pos-
THARVEST BURNING, http://northidahofarmers.org/factsvsmyths.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2004) (noting bluegrass burning was not responsible for any EPA air
quality standards).
160. See id. (explaining that these days usually occur in summertime).
161. See id. (discussing problems created by yearly standards for airborne
pollutants).
162. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041 (noting process of determining claim under
RCRA "citizen suit provision").
163. See id. at 1040-41 (citing purpose behind RCRA stated in AMC 1).
164. See id. at 1047-54 (Paez,J., dissenting) (objecting to majority's holding in
principal case).
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VI. IMPACT
Given that the primary issue in Safe Air involves the narrow
question of defining the term "discard," the direct effect of this de-
cision will likely be limited in scope. 165 In future Ninth Circuit
cases, bluegrass residue will not be considered "solid waste" under
RCRA. 166 Furthermore, other circuit courts will, at the very least,
consider this case when deciding similar fact patterns in their own
jurisdictions.167
The prevailing consequence of Safe Air may be the court's
method of determining whether a material is "solid waste."1 68 First,
the court interpreted RCRA using the accepted steps of statutory
interpretation: analysis of language and legislative history. 169 Next,
the court adopted the reasoning of other circuits when refining its
definition of "solid waste."1 70 The Ninth Circuit's decision to nar-
rowly read the undefined term "discarded materials" within the
greater definition of "solid waste" indicates that new measures
might be required within the field of environmental law.' 7 ' Such
measures, starting with a clearer statutory definition for "discarded
materials," would allow future litigants to proceed to the next, and
arguably more important, stage of the analysis: whether burning
agricultural waste is harmful to the public. 172
The Ninth Circuit failed to answer this question even though it
had legitimate means to do so. 1 73 The court could have read "dis-
carded materials" broadly to include bluegrass residue. 174 Instead,
the court chose to use a restricted definition of "discarded materi-
165. See id. at 1041 (noting that issue of whether bluegrass residue is "solid
waste" under RCRA is "crux of the case").
166. See id. at 1047 (giving holding of case).
167. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041-43 (showing how Ninth Circuit examined
other circuit courts' precedents in determining definition of "solid waste").
168. See id. at 1040-41 (noting how court approached its review of RCRA and
its definitions).
169. See id. at 1045 (interpreting RCRA required court to examine statute's
language).
170. See id. at 1041-43 (discussing court's use of other circuit court cases in
defining "solid waste").
171. See id. at 1048-49 (Paez,J., dissenting) (noting court's definition of "dis-
carded materials" extends beyond plain, ordinary meaning).
172. See Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1048 n.3 (noting district court did not address
issue of whether burning bluegrass residue is dangerous to health or environ-
ment).
173. See id. at 1049 (explaining court could have stopped analysis at plain
meaning of "discard").
174. See id. at 1048-51 (noting bluegrass residue could fit within ordinary defi-
nition of "solid waste").
2006]
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als" for EPA regulation cases. 175 Because of the destructive nature
of SAFE's allegations against open burning, future litigants will
need a forum that will allow their complaints to be heard. 176 Oth-
erwise, RCRA, which was created to reduce the negative health ef-
fects arising from the disposal of solid waste, will fail.
Katherine E. Senior
175. See id. (noting court's decision to use restricted definition of "solid
waste").
176. See, e.g., FAQs, supra note 7, (detailing SAFE's allegations of ill health
effects caused by open burning of bluegrass residue).
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